20 March 2013
By Chea Sophal[1]
The Paris Peace Accords
(PPA)have been a main tool in setting down a vision of a new Cambodia that
would be built upon the foundations of human rights, democracy and the rule of
law. The Accords involved the process of
bringing peace to Cambodia after years of civil conflict and the transitional
government under U.N control namely the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC).
The Paris Peace Accords
Signing of PPA
The Paris Peace
Accords (PPA)were signed on 23 October 1991 in Paris in order to end Cambodia’s
civil war over the past 10 years from 1979 to 1991 and to include the four
Khmer factions such as the State of Cambodia (SOC), Democratic Kampuchea (DK), FUNCINPEC
(Front Uni National Pour Un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique et
Cooperatif –United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and
Co-operative Cambodia) and Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF)to find
common grounds for peace. This Agreement
allowed the establishment of a U.N transitional authority that shared power
temporarily with representatives of the various factions in Cambodia. The Accord was signed by 19 countries
including Cambodia[2] in the
Paris International Peace Conference on Cambodia held in Paris, France and it
called for a Transitional Authority of the United Nations in Cambodia, which
would carry out the UN peace keeping operation.
The PPA was made based on a “framework” agreement reached by the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (IDEA 2003, p.50).
Main
Commitments in PPA
The Agreement on a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict dated 23 October
1991has three major commitments include as follows (ICG 1998, p.11):
1. The concept of peaceful resolution of
conflicts:
The Accord assigned
their Cambodian and signatory countries of the pact to certain principles,
including building up a liberal democracy operating under the rule of law as
well as peaceful resolution of conflicts.
It linked demilitarization with promotion of electoral democracy. The four Khmer armed forces involved in the
civil war agreed to cease fire, disarm and demobilize ahead of elections while
their political organizations would compete peacefully for the legitimate
mandate in the upcoming elections in 1993(Hughes, Cambodia's
Performance n.d., p.7).
2. The establishment of a multi-party
liberal democracy:
The provisions of the
Paris Peace Accords outlined the UN Peace Keeping Mission to hold general
elections for a 120-member assembly in May 1993. One of the four parties, Khmer Rouge, which
had signed the peace agreement, boycotted the elections because it accused the
Phnom Penh Government of preventing a free and fair election. Then, the three
main parties such as the Royalist FUNCINPEC Party, the ruling Cambodian
People’s Party and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, remained contesting
the elections.
The Accord put
Cambodia on a process of democratic reconstruction and transition to a market
economy and it provided Cambodian people with the right to choose their
government through fee and fair elections organized in May 1993. As a result of
the UNTAC presence, a constitutional monarchy was formed and King Sihanouk was
assigned as Head of State. The
Government of co-prime ministers was established through power-sharing between
the two parties, FUNCINPEC and CPP(EC 2004, p.14).
3. Respect for human rights:
The Paris Peace Accords
still remains relevant for Cambodians and those countries that are assisting
the country until its vision is a reality for all Cambodian people. The Accord required compliance by all
factions to protect and promote the respect for human rights as an important
part of the peace process. Article 15 of the Peace Accords under Part III
expresses that all persons in Cambodia and all Cambodian refugees and displaced
persons shall enjoy the rights and freedom embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments.
The mandate of UNTAC
in the area of human rights was outlined in Section E of the UNTAC Mandate[3]
through the establishment of a Human Rights Component with the responsibilities
for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental
freedom was ensured (Findlay 1995, p.63). UNTAC would also be involved in the
investigation of human rights complaints and where appropriate provide
corrective action.
Democratic Development in the UNTAC Era
UNTAC was solely responsible for
ensuring the implementation of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords on the
comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. UNTAC had the following mandates:
·
To demobilize an agreed 70% of each faction's
army and to send back the rest to the cantonments;
·
To take back the arms and to store them in the
cantonments;
·
To enforce a ceasefire and to ensure that
further military supplies were not channeled from China, Vietnam, ASEAN
countries and other foreign sources;
·
To administer the country until an election in
1993;
·
To take over the defence, foreign affairs,
public security, finance and information portfolios; and
·
To ensure that human rights are adhered to.
|
Article V of (Annex
2: Withdrawal, Cease-Fire and Related Measures) Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict
The
presence of UNTAC aimed at respect for human rights, organizing national
election, military agreements, civil administration, maintenance of order and
law, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and rehabilitation of Cambodian
infrastructure. UNTAC organized
democratic elections in Cambodia from the ground up since the factional parties
did not trust each other to implement any crucial element of the peace
process. Any election run by one of four
parties in the Peace Agreement and monitored by the UNTAC would have been prone
to serious exploitation or manipulation.
Therefore, it was absolutely vital that the UNTAC had to organize the
electoral processes (Doyle and Sambanis 1999, p.22).
The
U.N organized elections in 1993 laid down a democratic process in Cambodia. The
U.N operation in Cambodia led to the creation of a liberal political framework
that included a liberal constitution, an increase in the number of civil
society activities and a surge of a more variety of outspoken media (Gainsborough
2011, p.303).
Since then Cambodia engaged with more donors in order to build political
legitimacy through a shaky democratic process[4]. The Supreme National Council (SNC) was the
unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the
transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and the unity of Cambodia
are enshrined[5]. Under the Accord, a UNTAC civilian police
component was responsible for ensuring that law and order be maintained and
that human rights and fundamental freedoms be fully protected throughout
Cambodia.[6]
During
the UNTAC mandate, the peace process allowed the normalization of diplomatic
relations and Cambodia received increased development assistance, and such
assistance was extended to new political areas of the country such as the
introduction of human rights principles and practices and the establishment of
basic understanding and experiences with regard to multi-party democratic
practices (Curtis 1993, p.22).
Not
long after the 1993 elections, escalation of political tension and violence
took place in 1997 in which government forces loyal to Co-Prime Minister Hun
Sen staged a coup that ousted his Co-Prime Minister Ranariddh, and a lot of
leaders of the royalist troops were executed.
Royalist self-exiled politicians fled the bloody fighting and returned
for the July 1998 elections in which they lost voter support for around 14%
from 45.47 down to 31.70 in 1998. It
continued to decline to 20.75% and 5.05% in 2003 and 2008 respectively. CPP gained support from 38.23% in 1993 to
58.11 in 2008. For the last two
elections, SRP remained steady with its support accounting for almost the same,
22% in 2003 and 2008. BLDP and the
Molinaka Party did not win any seats in 1998 and the last two subsequent
elections. Two new parties, HRP and NRP,
emerged for competing 2008 election and as results they won 3 and 2 seats
respectively.
May, 1993
|
July, 1998
|
July, 2003
|
July, 2008
|
|||||
Party
|
Number of Seats
|
Percentage of valid votes
est
|
Number of Seats
|
Percentage of valid votes
est
|
Number of Seats
|
Percentage of valid votes
est
|
Number of Seats
|
Percentage of valid votes
est
|
FUNCINPEC
|
58
|
45.47
|
43
|
31.7
|
26
|
20.75
|
2
|
5.05
|
Cambodian People's Party
(CPP)
|
51
|
38.23
|
64
|
41.4
|
73
|
47.35
|
90
|
58.11
|
Buddhist Liberal
Democratic Party (BLDP)
|
10
|
3.81
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
Molinaka Party
|
1
|
1.37
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
Sam Rainsy Party (SRP)
|
-
|
-
|
15
|
14.3
|
24
|
21.87
|
26
|
21.91
|
Human Rights Party (HRP)
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
3
|
6.62
|
Norodom Ranariddh Party
(NRP)
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
2
|
5.62
|
|
Others
|
-
|
11.12
|
0
|
12.6
|
-
|
10.03
|
0
|
2.69
|
Total of Parliamentary
Seats
|
120
|
122
|
123
|
123
|
Source:
Consolidated data from (IPU 2011)
To sum up, the legacy UNTAC put in
place includes the basics of a civil society, a freer press and a more
politically aware populate than when it arrived. In addition, it left a democratically elected
legislature and coalition government of the three most favored political
parties (FUNCINPEC, CPP and BLDP) in the country.
References
Curtis, G. (1993). Transition to What? Cambodia,
UNTAC and the Peace Process. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development .
Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (1999). Building
Peace: Challenges and Strategies After Civil War. Washington: Princeton
University.
EC. (2004). Cambodia Country Strategy Paper
2004-2006. Phnom Penh: European Commission.
Findlay, T. (1995). Cambodia: The Legacy and
Lessons of UNTAC. Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute.
Gainsborough, M. (2011). The Future Autocracies
in South East Asia: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Taipe: University of
Bristol.
Hughes, C. Cambodia's Performance.
Birmingham: Department of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Birmingham.
ICG. (1998). Getting Cambodia Ready for
Elections. Phnom Penh: International Crisis Group.
IDEA. (2003). Reconciliation After Violent
Conflict. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance.
IPU. (2011). CAMBODIA: Radhsphea Ney Preah
Recheanachakr Kampuchea (National Assembly). Retrieved February 10, 2012,
from Inter-Parliarmentary Union:
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2051_03.htm
[1] Chea Sophal is taking the Doctoral Degree of Law (LLD) at
Pannasastra University of Cambodia in Phnom Penh. This is an extract from the term paper study
on ‘The Paris Peace Accords and the Development of Democracy in Cambodia’ as
part of the term paper submitted for the coursework under the Doctor of Law
Programme on POL 712-Transnational Relations and World Politics
[2] The inclusive list of countries signing the
Paris Peace Accords include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, the
People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Republic of India, the
Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of
Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
[3]Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement
of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1: UNTAC Mandate, Section E.
[4]A process that was not stable for the
development of democracy in Cambodia since there have been restrictions on
freedom of association and expression witnessed by arrests of human rights
activists, human right defender and killing of journalists. Almost a dozen
journalists were killed in Cambodia in the past two decades since the U.N
sponsored elections were held in 1993. Namely, those murdered journalists were
identified as Tho Cha Mongkul, Noun Chan, Ek Mongkul, Sao Chandara, Chet
Doungdararith, Thun Bunly, Pech Em, Ou Savoeun, Khem Sambo, Chou Chetharith,
Hang Serei Odom, and foreign journalist Michael Senior (RFA 2012).
[5] Agreements on a Comprehensive
Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Section III, Article 3
[6] Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement
of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1: UNTAC Mandate, Section B(5/b)
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